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The Mysteries of Corporate Law:
A Response to Brudney and Chirelstein
To the Editors:
In 1974, Professors Victor Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein published an
article that suggested formulae for deciding whether minority shareholders of
a subsidary receive fair treatment in a controlled merger.' In 1977, in Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,2 the Seventh Circuit relied on that article in con-
cluding that the merger terms being reviewed were fair. As Professor Simon
Lorne pointed out recently, "it is clear from the Seventh Circuit decision
in Mills that the court did not fully understand the concepts set forth in
the Brudney & Chirelstein article."3 "A least in stock mergers," he explained,
the Brudney & Chirelstein approach yielded an ascertainable, satisfying
and simple solution .... In the context of non-stock mergers the ad-
vantages of certainty and simplicity are lost, and the intrinsic appeal of
the analysis disappears. Thus, the value of the Brudney &- Chirelstein
approach may lie more in what it has provoked than in the solution it
proposed-but the value of provocation is not inconsiderable. 4
The analysis in the Lorne article wholly supports its criticisms of the
limited relevance and applicability of the Brudney and Chirelstein thesis.
It does not, however, adequately account for the persuasiveness of that
thesis, which is evidenced by the fact that the Seventh Circuit decided a case
by applying it. An analysis of what makes the Brudney and Chirelstein
thesis persuasive seems especially necessary since they have recently applied
it to the area of corporate freezouts.5 Although the Lorne article recognizes
that "[h]aving challenged the simple approach of the Brudney and Chirel-
stein analysis, it is perhaps incumbent upon the author to provide some
guidance to the courts,"O that guidance is limited to admonitions that
recognition be given to the rights of all parties, that imprecision is inherent
in any search for total fairness, and that the standards by which the fairness
of business transactions are judged must be based on the information avail-
1. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 297 (1974).
2. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
3. Lorne, A Rea5praisal of Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. Rlv. 955,
956 (1978).
4. Id. at 987.
5. See Brudncy & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Freezeouts].
6. Lorne, supra note 3, at 988.
235
The Yale Law Journal
able to businessmen before the consummation of those transactions.7 In
assuming the burden borne by critics of Brudney and Chirelstein, it is my
hope that the following analysis of the persuasiveness of their thesis will
provide more guidance than these three admonitions.
I
The recent expansion of the Brudney and Chirelstein thesis in this
Journal, entitled A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, begins with a
description of the 1977 decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Singer
v. Magnavox Co.,8 a case involving the acquisition of Magnavox by North
American Phillips Corporation. Later in their article, Brudney and Chirel-
stein note that
it is possible that the Delaware court was concerned about the com-
promise between the managements of North American and Magnavox,
which included new employment contracts for the latter. Indeed, this
may have been a crucial factor, for it raises the question whether the
transaction was truly arm's length, or whether the Magnavox manage-
ment had in fact received a personal consideration for its change of
position. This may partly explain why the supreme court directed the
court of chancery to reexamine the "entire fairness" of the transaction
on remand. Just how such a re-examination is to be carried out remains
something of a mystery.9
Since the original Brudney and Chirelstein article was entitled Fair Shares
in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,'0 it seems clear that this confession
concerning the mystery of the Singer remand raises basic questions as to the
heuristic value of their thesis.
Brudney and Chirelstein agree that "an alert interest in the bona fides of
the target's management in the takeover ... is a welcome development," but
attempt to limit the impact of their confession by concluding that, in the
absence of the mystery presented by the "question [of] the bona fides of the
target's management, the pattern of overhead tender plus merger at the
tender price is one in which issues both of 'purpose' and of 'fairness' are
beside the point."" In Young v. Valhi,12 however, which Brudney and
Chirelstein cite as possibly fitting one of the hypotheticals they use in
analyzing the question of whether a merger is in fact the second step in an
acquisition (rather than an independent transaction),13 the Chancellor ex-
plicitly stated that "it is unnecessary to pass on the overall fairness of the
price per share offered to minority stockholders of Valhi," a determination
based on what he believed "to have been the use of technically correct but
7. Id.
8. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
9. Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 1364-65.
10. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1.
11. Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 1365.
12. 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
13. Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 1361 n.15.
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devious corporate action . . . for the purpose of accomplishing a merger
designed to eliminate all minority stockholders of Valhi."'14 The short of the
matter, then, is that the question of fairness cannot be separated from that
of bona fides, and that the law, to be effective, must cope with mysteries
inaccessible to devotees of the Brudney and Chirelstein thesis.
Brudney and Chirelstein suggest that "[t]he current upheaval in Delaware
law [of which Singer is an example] may well be traceable to criticisms
articulated in" Professor Gary's article, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware.15 They fail to point out, however, that the
case in which the Supreme Court of the United States cited that article,
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,"; reversed a holding by the Second Cir-
cuit concerning a Delaware short-form merger transaction used by the ma-
jority shareholders of a corporation to eliminate the minority interest. The
Second Circuit had held that a cause of action had been stated under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 by a complaint
seeking to set aside the merger or recover what was claimed to be the fair
value of the minority shares. 17
In other words, whether or not Santa Fe led to the "welcome develop-
ment in the jurisprudence" of Delaware of "an alert interest in the bona
fides ... of management,"'1 the actual holding in that case was that values
of federalism-the fact that corporate law is regarded in the United States
as a matter of state rather than federal law-outweighed the desirability of a
single uniform rule concerning the standards to be applied in determining
the fairness of a short-form merger. For such a holding to be acceptable,
there must exist considerations that outweigh the desirability of clear and
uniform rules, considerations that distinguish the law from formulae such
as those contained in the Brudney and Chirelstein thesis.
II
In the briefest terms, it is my contention that those considerations derive
from the nature of human competitiveness and self-awareness. Thus, the
clearer and more uniform a rule is, the more likely it is to be regarded as a
formality that can justifiably be manipulated so long as compliance with
its explicit formulation is maintained. Reference to the Internal Revenue
Service should be sufficient to demonstrate the considerable social costs
involved in enforcing any system of rules communicated solely in terms of
clear formulae or uniform doctrine and allowing for no resort to judicial
,'mysteries."
In more concrete terms, it is my argument that the economic formulae
underlying the Brudney and Chirelstein thesis significantly underestimate
the extent to which human competitiveness limits the effectiveness of any
control device based solely on an economic description of behavior. Thus,
14. 582 A.2d at 1378.
15. Freezeouts, suPra note 5, at 1354 n.2 (citing Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974)).
16. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
17. Id. at 469.
18. Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 1365.
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any sufficiently uniform formula will at some point be exploited by the
development of an application not derivable from the regularities in terms
of which the formula has historically been defined. If such economic
formulae are defined as the law of the marketplace, entrepreneurs can be
defined as individuals who develop successful variations and United States
corporate law as a system of rules that attempts both to limit and to en-
courage entrepreneurial activity, while simultaneously refusing to distin-
guish rules applicable to entrepreneurs from those that govern the business
activities of others.
List v. Fashion Park, Inc.10 seems to be proof that the preceding paragraph
accurately describes the application of Rule lOb-5, since the court's sole
basis for the refusal to allow recovery was List's status as "an experi-
enced and successful investor."2 0 Similarly, in Delaware, it is clear that
corporate law involves potentially conflicting bases of decision rather than
one clear set of formulae. In Young v. Valhi, Inc., the Chancellor held that
"it is unnecessary to pass on ... whether or not reasons given for the pro-
posed merger, namely tax savings and avoidance of future conflicts of in-
terest, were largely contrived." 21 Such a holding was necessary because of
possible conflicts with earlier Delaware cases. In Condec Corp. v. Lunken-
heimer Co., 22 in which the Chancellor ordered the cancellation of certain
shares allegedly issued solely to block an attempt to gain voting control of
the corporation, it had been contended that the corporation's shares were
issued "in order to preserve [its] existence for tax purposes as well as to
avoid a possible violation of the Delaware statutory voting requirement for
a corporate dissolution."23 The Chancellor characterized these alleged
business purposes as "obscure." 24 No stronger holding was ventured because
an earlier Delaware Supreme Court decision had reversed a recovery for
improper use of corporate funds based on a finding by the Vice Chancellor
that the actual purpose for purchasing company shares with such funds was
the desire to maintain control of the corporation.25
III
One consequence of this line of cases is the requirement that each
decision be read narrowly to ascertain its precedential effect. The resultant
doctrine, although lacking uniformity, constitutes a far more concrete law of
corporations than that available in most jurisdictions. Consequently, one
of the values of federalism promoted by the Santa Fe decision was that
corporate lawyers in other states could continue to rely on the fact that
sufficient litigation would occur in Delaware to give warning of the pos-
sibility of a shift in the need to comply with arguably conflicting legal re-
19. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
20. Id. at 464.
21. 382 A.2d at 1378.
22. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
23. Id. at 775.
24. Id.
25. See Cheff v. Mathcs, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), cited in Condec Corp. v. Lunkcn-
heimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 776 (Del. Ch. 1967).
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quirements or, if necessary, to incorporate in Delaware itself to maximize
the advantages of such judicial signals. Despite these advantages provided
by the centralization of litigation within a single court system, however, the
fact remains that federalism also affords the opportunity for evasion of rules
intended to be applicable. In SEC v. Transamerica Corp.,2 6 for example,
the district court refused to order certain proposals to be submitted to
shareholders for action at the next annual meeting on the basis that
"nothing in the General Corporation Law of Delaware . . . requires [the
corporation] to give stockholders notice of [a] by-law amendment."2 7 The
Third Circuit reversed on this basis: "If this minor provision [of the
corporation's bylaws, which required the Board of Directors to approve any
proposed bylaw amendment] may be employed as Transamerica seeks to
employ it, it will serve to circumvent the intent of Congress in enacting the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It was the intent of Congress to require fair
opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage."2 8 The Third Circuit's
decision in fact represented the use of federal law to check state regulation,
an overriding of considerations of federalism accepted because it was per-
ceived as procedural rather than substantive.
The extent to which necessary corporate reforms at the time of this
decision were perceived in terms of process is evident from the nature of
the bylaw amendments being proposed for shareholder action in Trans-
america: a shift in the site of the annual meeting, the election of in-
dependent public auditors by the shareholders, and a requirement that a
report of the annual meeting proceedings be sent to all shareholders. 29
During the past three decades, as such procedural reforms began to be
perceived as inadequate, the focus of federal corporate litigation shifted to
attempts to obtain redress under Rule lOb-5 for manipulations involving
corporate securities.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores' o called a halt to the promulga-
tion of federal substantive corporate law by declaring that the Second
Circuit had been right in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.-" when it held
that section 10(b) "was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or
fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities
rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that
Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or
seller."' 2 Precisely what the Supreme Court's holding means is, of course, a
mystery, and the circuit courts are currently attempting to decide whether
it mandates a return to the standing requirements delineated in Birnbaum,
or simply draws to a halt the expansion of federal lOb-5 jurisdiction, by
holding that the Birnbaum rationale should not further be eroded.
26. 67 F. Supp. 326 (D. Dcl. 1946), modified, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 847 (1948).
27. Id. at 331.
28. 163 F.2d at 518.
29. Id. at 513 & n.l.
30. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
31. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
32. Id. at 464; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
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IV
What has been suggested is that the persuasiveness of the Brudney and
Chirelstein thesis inheres in the discomfort caused by mystery, in the need
to believe that the courts can accomplish their task of judging the fairness
of corporate transactions by imposing clear and uniform formulae on
entrepreneurial activities. This argument is based on the proposition that a
system of law conforming to such requirements entails expenditures such as
those needed to administer effectively the rules of taxation: expenditures
our society is thus far unwilling to make for the purpose of governing
corporate behavior. In the context of the historical development of federal
corporate law adumbrated above, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. provides
an example of the gaps and inconsistencies necessarily involved in judicial
decisions that attempt simultaneously to rationalize such a development
and to administer effectively a system of rules governing competitive human
behavior. The Santa Fe decision makes clear that an allegation that merger
terms are unfair per se does not state a federal cause of action under Rule
lOb-5. The result, as the Lorne article puts it, is
an inherent confusion between the nature of the wrong and the nature
of the remedy in cases like Mills. The wrong claimed is not unfairness,
but rather nondisclosure. After the fact, however, the nondisclosure
wrong cannot be meaningfully remedied. The unfairness claim may be
seen as a hybrid right of action that is developing under Section 14 ....
[T]he potential remedy is not related to the wrong, but Mills creates
one remedy for the combination of nondisclosure and unfairness where
none other would be possible in the federal courts.33
Perhaps the most striking example of the difficulties involved in promul-
gating a formula to govern competitive human behavior effectively is
provided by the history of Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane
Corp.,34 a decision that appears to represent a conscious judicial attempt
to define the common law of corporate political competition. The question
presented was that of the permissible uses of corporate funds in proxy
contests. A majority of four refused to accept the three-person dissenting
view that expenditures in excess of those "incurred in giving widespread
notice to stockholders of questions affecting the welfare of the corporation"
are ultra vires,3 5 presumably because this formula failed to respond effec-
tively to incumbent management's claim on corporate resources at least for
the purpose of making the contest with insurgents an equal one in financial
terms.3" The fourth member of the majority, however, joined the three-
person opinion delineating a distinction between "personal power" and
"policy" contests in a concurring opinion that appeared to be restricted to
a ruling on the technical question of allocating burden of proof.3T The
33. Lorne, suPra note 3, at 966 n.35.
34. 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
35. Id. at 185, 128 N.E.2d at 300.
36. Id. at 173, 128 N.E.2d at 293.
37. Id. at 174-76, 128 N.E.2d at 293-95.
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final comment of that opinion, however, leaves open the possibility that
there may exist situations in which campaign expenditures would be found
to be "intrinsically unlawful,"3 8 thus creating the mystery of precisely what
it is that this decision means. Equally important, however, for purposes of
the argument advanced here, is the fact that relatively few courts have
applied the majority's "personal power/policy" formula to the cases before
them. The reason, as a California court recently put it, is that "[t]he rule is
uncertain in application because every contest involves or can be made to





38. Id. at 176, 128 N.E.2d at 295.
59. Braude v. Havenner, 38 Cal. App. d 526, 532, 113 Cal. Rptr. 586, 389 (1974).

